ll Gr01Jjl on Ad,iriciH.1 TntelligerlCe, ".J{)'18f'r ALLilH.'· UniVf�rsi(,y, Szeged, A r'adi nt. tere 1, Ihmgary, Abstract. \Ve show thaI, H.daptive n�al time dyrmmic prograrnming ex tended with the action selection strategy which chooses the best action rian. H'om this it follows that learning and exploitation do not confiict under this special optimality criterion. We relate this result to learning optimal strategies in repeated two-player zero-sum deterministic games.
Introduction
R.einforcement learning (R. L) concerns practical problems related to learning of optimal behaviour in seq11ential decision tasks. The most pop111ar theoretical framel,york adopted by RL researchers is that of Markovian Decision Problems PilDPs). One of the main questions in RL is "\-"hat extent of exploration is needed for a learner so that the price of exploration does not become too demanding. Usually some exploration (e.g. the execution of explorative actions that seem sub-optimal for the learner) is needed otherwise the learner may not gather some relevant information and this may eventually prcvent convergence to optimality,
i.e., the need for exploration and exploitation conflict.
In this paper we show that it is possible to obtain asymptotically optimal bchaviour for rv IDPs under the minimax discounted total cost criterion with an algorithm that UReR an (J8ynchronoru;} on-linc dynamic programming (DP)[-I] it eraLion while execuLing Oe/i017S Owl seem oplimal according 10 Ihe ae/ual :;lole oj the learner�s knowledge. :1'1inimax sequential decision problems arise for example in repeated (or dynamic) games which arc of great popularity in the machine learning community. Asynchronous on-line DP is a variant of value iteration which is advantageous when the state and action sets are so large that it is im practica, l to run a DP algorithm off-line, or when one is satisfied with obta, ining an asymptotically optimal behaviour on some "relevant'� part of the state space.
The paper is organized as foHm-vs: In Section 2 we provide the necessary background. In Section :) \ve pref;ent important prelimina, ry ref>l1ltB concerning self-optimizing policies, the convergence of real-time D P and the main theorem. In Section 4 \ve discuss the results, and relate them to the context of learning to play repeated, two-player, zero-sum determinif;tic gamef>. Due to f;pace limitf> we can not present the proofs. The complete proofs and also the proofs of the unattributed statements can be found in [11, 10] . 
is the transition probability function \vhich satisfies LYEXp(.r"a,y) = I fo1' all (.r"a) E U' and 4. c: U x �y --+ IR is the immediate cost function AL every :::l tage of the decit;ioll procetl.':l the deci:sion ma.ker obt;erve::; one of the states of X (called the state of the decision Inaker) and is allmved to choose an action from A(: r), which is then applied as an input to the "'Yfltem. As a ref>l1lt, if the state of the decision maker \vas x E X and action a .vas chosen then the next state of the decision maker becomes y E X \vith probability p ( J.:, a� y). Further, the application of action (J, in state ;:t incurf; an immediate COf;t (;(;:t� 0, V).
The behaviour of the decision maker should be non-anticipating, i.e., it is as sumed that it can be described by a (deterministic) policy IT = (ITO� 'iT1,
where 1I"t : (X x A) t X X -+ A determine the action to be taken at the tth time as a function of the history of the process ((xo, ao), (Xl, al),' .. , (;?;t-I, at-I)) and the current state Xt. A policy is called Markovian if the actions taken by the policy depend only on the current state. A policy is stationary if it is Markovian and 'iTt = 11"0 for all t.
Due to the stochastic nature of the decision problem r a policy ' Xi.o. (T) = { x E X I Tt = (x, at) infinitely often }. 2 We indentify the set () xX with the set {(x,Q,y) E X xAxX I (x,a) E LI,y EX}.
Similarly, for all x E Xi.a.(T) let us define Ai.a.T(X) <; A(x) as the set of actions that are chof>en infinitely ma, ny timet'; dlJring the trajectory r:
The total cost incurred by the decision maker can be defined as follows: For an:y trajector:y T = ((,l; O� ao)� (:1;1, (1,1), ... � (,J;t, ad, ... ) of the proceRR the imme diate cosLt; incurred during Lhe proce. ':ltl define the tlLochastlc variable C;(xo) = L:�o"l c(x t , at:Xt+l)' ."here 0 < "/ < 1 is a fixed discount factor. C;(;-ro) is called the total discOllllted cost along trajectory T. Since the va, riahle C;(.TO) iR random it doe .
., nol determine all ordering of Lhe policle15 -�'dec.il':l.ion funeLions" � "yh ich map random variables to values must be used if one would like to arrive at an ordering [4] . One possibility is to use the ess SllP operator \yhen the cost of a policy 11" for a given starting state ;'/;0 is determined as the vwrst probable value of C;(xo) :
This gives rise to the minimax criterion: Rince the optimal CORt funcion defined
) call now he \vrit,t,ell as
The opti.uw. l cOI":lL functi.on can be I5ho\vn to I":latisfy the nellinan Opti.mality Equa
,v E X.
( 1)
Since this criterion does not depend on the exact numerical values of the tran
Rition prohahiliticR we introduce the setfi
and for convenience \ve will call the .)-tllple P = (X: A, A, T, r) a TVlarkovian Decision Process (MDP), too. In the following a MDP will be understood with flu; In-in-hn.o:r r;-r-ilf: J'iOH.
Once the optimal cost fllllction is identified, the optimal policies of the de ciRion maker arc ca.",), to detcrminc: the pOf;sihlc optimal choicefi for Rtate ,r, arc given as the elemen/$ 01 the set A P (;r, '/)p), \vhere
Let R(X) denote the set of rea. l-valued bounded functionR over the Ret X and
"("sing G: Equation (1) takes the shorter form Gvp = 'v�, i.e., v� is the fixed point of G. It if> easy to prove that G if> a contraction with index '"';/ w.r.t. the Rllpreml1l11 norm II ·11= , and therefore it has only one fixed point and the sequence 'L't+l = GVI, ""here 'Vo E B(X) is arbitrary, convcrges to '0;,. This iteration is called the (synchronollR) dynamic programming (Snp) iteration. Tf it is important to indicate the problem underlying the greedy operator C (often also called the value operator) then this ""ill be denoted by a subscript: such a.'S Gp. If we do not use the subscript, this means that the greedy operator that corresponds to P (the trlle model of the syf>tcm under control ) is conf>idered.
In this article we consider the adaptive algorithm given in Table 1 . The algo ritlull consists of ;1 lIlain parts: a Illodel building pa.rt (Step 2), a cost-function estimation pa. rt (Step;3 and 4) , and the action f>eicction procedure (Step 5). The algordhm a/way,<; rhoo,<;u; the greedy (jd-ion w. r.t. the late,<;t e,<;t-lmate of the rmit function. \Ve ,,,ill prove that despite this non-explorative choice of actions, the vpIXi.,L(T) = lim Vtlx (T):
F!J.rthcr, for the,<;e tmjertoriu; the algorithm rUilI.lts -in an opt-lmol strategy -in finite lime, i.e.! Ihere p::risls a (random) lhnpT 81/(;h Uwl -ifl > T lhen (1t E AP(Xt: "lip).
The proof if> carried out in several stepf>. First one proves the theorem in the special ca.o;; e l,.vhen the immediate costB are knO\\'n in advance. The idea of Lhiti proof it; tha.t for any pair (;L'. a) E r-r the seL Tt(x, oj 111Onotonically increatles in time and since [J is finite there exists a time To such that if t > To then O. Let 10(.1:,CJ) � :L'(x,CJ),co(:r,CJ,y):S c(x,CJ:y) and vo:S v;','V o E ll(X). repeat forever{ 1. Observe the current state .Ct and the reinforcement sip;nal Ct. \vh�r'f' Gp t+ 1 is l.h� acl.lml f'stima(.f' or !.ll� gr�f'dy opf'ral.or G Im.<;�d 011 Pt+l. 5. Action selection: at E AP t+ l (.Ct, Vt+l)' 6. EXCCIJl.c !.lIC acl.ion.
Mod;fy
,. l := l. + 1. } Table 1 . \Tyopic AdapLiVf' R�l-l.l-Limf' Dynamic Programming (MARTDP).
Til S(.f'P 4 (.hf' Ilpdalf' or a sl.al.p. x, ror whi(�h !.ll�r·p. is no non-�mply T"Cr,rL), should bp.
Ilndcr·sl.ood ;-L<; l.he idcnl.ily operal.ion. (i) " £s even.tually optimal, i.e., for almost all trajectory T gen erated by 7r and .TO then: cri8t a timr: T .'Il1(;h that ift > T thr;n a(r, t) is optimal.
TI(>:,a)
(ii) For almost all trajEctory T thE optinwl cost function of P satisfies If the costs are not known in advance then we have a sequence of cost functions, Ct, which iR lllonotonically increasing and (f'>ince they are hOllllded hy r;) converges to some function co;:: . , The rest of the proof follows almost the same lines as the proof when the costs arc knmvn in advance, The complete proof can be found in [10] . Kote that in order to prove the convergence of the adaptive version ,ve had to prove the convergence of the non-adaptive version. \Ve could not find any simple way to extend the convergence proof of the RTDP theorem by Barto ct "I. [I] or that of the LK:I'A' algorithm by Korf [ , 5 ] to om caRC. Thc main dirrerellces are LIlaL BarLo eL al. aSSIJIlie Lllat Ft = {:r: d in endl step wIlidl makes it possible to reduce the convergence of the RTDP algorithm to that of the asynchronoufl dynamic programming in a direct way and that I{orf aSfiumed deterministic transitions \vhich enables a non-probabilistic approach simplifying the proof greatly. 4 Consequences for repeated two-player zero-sum deterministic games \Ve show that repeated two-player zero-sum deterministic games can be vie\ved a,fi minimax control problemf'>. Tn fiuch a game one or the other player choof'>es an action in each state with one player striving to minimize the total cost and the other trying to maximize it. A great deal of RL research has been directed to fiolving games of this kind [13, 14, 7� 2, 12, 6J. It is possible to define a set of Dellman equations for the optimal minimax value of such a game, if minimizer moves in x if maximizer moveR in x, where C(x, a) ifl the COflt inCllrTed by the minimir,ing player (and is the reward of the maximi7,ing player since the game is zero sum in each step) and t(; r� a ) is the next state when action a is executed from x [8J. vVithout loosing generality one may i:t,'SSUlne Lha.L the Lwo players move one anolher in ea.ch sLep, i.e., the move of player I is always followed by the move of player II, and vice versa. 1 \00v, it ifi ea.sy to flee that the refltriction of V" to thoRe fitatefi in which the minilnizer moves saLisfieti the equaliLy l/* (x) = minnEA ma�I E:1' ( x , a) (c(x, a, y) + ,'P(y)), where T (x, a ) = {t(t(x,a),b)lb E A) and c(x,a,y) = e (x, a ) + ')' maXI: >:t(f(x.a) , h)::: l I C(t(;1:, (1 ) , 1»). This shows that from the point of vie,,,, of the minimizer the game is of minimax nature. If the rules of the game arc knmvn to the miniluizer, i.e., she ha.,; access to r: and T, then it follmvs fro111 our results that her policy ,,,,ill become eventually optimal if she plays according to the rv IRTDP algorithm. It is interesting to note that ir the minimir,er plays ,,,,ah a maximir,er wIlo llses a fixed (aHhougll arbitrary) policy then she can do even better if he uses the adaptive version of the \lRTDP algorithm. Tf the maximizer llsefi an eventual ly flub-optimal policy LIlen iL lllay happen that TcXJ (x, oj as learned hy Ule MA RTDP algoriLlllll will be a proper subset of T( x 1 a) . The optimal cost function associated ,,,,ith the rv ID P (�Y, A, A: T:xn c) may be smaller then V-": meaning that the adaptive strategy allowR the minimizer to take advantage of the Rll b-optimality of the policy of the maximizer. However, if the maximizer eventually finds the optimal counter policy then the ;'adaptive" minimizer may perform worse in terms of the total regret than the non-adaptive version. Tf both the minimizer and the maximj,. ;er use the :VIARTDP algorithm (the above proofs can be trivially extended to Illaximin models) then both player ""ill eventually play the optimal policies. In other words, if an agent trained by rv IARTDP plays against herself then Rhe ifi gWlTanteed to find the optimal policy eventually. \-Ve have compared the leartling curves or ARTDP algoriLlllns wit,h dirrerent actioll seledion strategies on the game 'Tic-Tac-Toe'. The results (to be presented clsel ,vhere) shm" that the myopic strategiefi (i.e., the M A HTD P algorithm) yieklR the faRtest convergence.
It iR important to note that 0111' reRlllt abOllt the MAR'I'I)P algorithm doeR nul exLend Lo the ca:::; e of :sLocha:::; Lic gaines vviLh Lhe expecltxl LoLal di:scounLed cost criterion. The reason of this can be understood by considering the following Rimple caRe: aSfillllW that the Rta, te Rpace has only one element and we have two aeLioll:S, ({ and b. LeL Lhe co:::; L of Lhe aeLion:::; be random wiLh finite expecLeu values Q"(b) < Q*(a) (this problCIll can also be given in terms of deterministic costs and stochaRtic transitionR over an r:ll lgmented state space). The problem is the action with the minimal cost. The rvlARTDP procedure (with the greedy action selection strategy) will choose the action with the smallest estimated cost, i.e., it chooses a if Q,(a) < Qt(b). If Qa(b) > Q,(a) for all t then the algorithm will fail to find the optimal action, lJ. This fiituation may happen \vith p(),<;ilh;� p'f'olHlbilily ir Qo(b) > Q*(lJ). aile lTlay nOLice that Lhe conditions or Theorem 1 out rule this possibility. Now, if Qo :S Q* for both a and b1 then due to the non-zero variance of the random CORt it may fitill happen with positive prohahility that Qt(b) > Q*(l,) > Qda) ror SOllie I, alld thlls \ve nnd again that the MARTDP algorithm fails with positive probability. Another problem arises when jllSt part of the Rtate Rpace (in fact Rtate-action space) is visited infinitely often. For expected value models improperly estimated values of finitely visited states may result in improper estimation of infinitly often visited states.
If the stochasticity in the effect of actions is caused by noise then the minimax optimality criterion will tend to find overly "peRsimiRtic'l polideR which may be undesirable. One may 'i"eaken this effect by introducing a positive threshold e and letting T( x, 0) = (y E X I P( x, 0, y) > OJ. In the adaptive case this calls for the identification of the tranfiition prohabilitieR. RecallRe of the stochasticity of the identification process the inclusions 1t(;-r, a) � T(x1 a) need no longer holds. This may prevent convergence to Llle optimal policy. To overcome thiR prohlem we propose to introduce state1 action and time dependent thresholds, et(x, a) which Rhollld con vergeR to e from above Rl owly. V'ole conjecture that by either llsing the law or iterated logarit,hm or a tl,VO-sLage estimation procedure as in [9] asymptotic convergence to an optimal policy can be retained.
